Michigan Law Review
Manuscript 6114

The New Michigan Pre-Trial Procedural Rules-Models for Other
States?
Robert Meisenholder

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Vol. 61

JUNE 1963

No. 8

THE NEW MICHIGAN PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURAL
RULES-MODELS FOR OTHER STATES?

Robert Meisenholder*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Michigan has completed a monumental task in its formulation and adoption
of these procedural laws. They encompass the most enlightened views of
modem procedural practice. Michigan proudly points to its achievement as a
milestone in modem procedural reform."l

new Michigan procedural laws are embodied in a revised
set of statutes and court rules which became effective January
I, 1963, after a long period of study by a Joint Committee on
Michigan Procedural Revision.2 They abolish an anachronistic
distinction between procedures in law and equity, abrogate a
scattered, disorganized set of rules and statutes, and create a
unified, coherent procedural system.
As a part of this system, the Michigan Supreme Court has
promulgated new General Court Rules similar to most of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 In this revision Michigan has
adopted some significant changes in the federal rules and some supplementary statutes of unusual interest. It has also retained some
important prior Michigan procedures. These deviations from and
changes in the federal rules will be reviewed for the purpose of
ascertaining whether they are desirable for use in states which
have adopted or are contemplating the adoption of the federal
rules system. For this purpose, discussions of the advantages and
disadvantages of state adoption of the federal rules system will not
be rehashed. Rather, it is assumed in this article that the federal
rules system is generally desirable for use by the states. 4 At the
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• Professor of Law, University of Washington.-Ed.
l Honigman, Procedural Changes in Michigan, 31 F.R.D. 113, 119 (1962).
2 Professor Charles W. Joiner of the University of Michigan was chairman of the
committee, and Mr. Jason L. Honigman, of the Detroit bar, was vice-chairman.
s The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are hereinafter referred to as the federal
rules. The new Michigan General Court Rules are hereinafter referred to as the Michigan
rules.
4 Some nineteen states have adopted the entire federal rules system. The status of
the movement to adopt the federal rules in state jurisdictions is reviewed in Wright,
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same time, it is assumed that consideration should be given to the
possibility of making particular revisions for state use.
One important consideration in judging state revisions of the
federal rules system is not discussed elsewhere in this article and
is not relied upon to support specific conclusions concerning the
Michigan changes. When a new procedural system is proposed in
a state jurisdiction and the federal rules system is used as a general
model, it is desirable to promote the ideal of uniformity in state
and federal practice by adoption of each federal rule without
major changes even though innovations or changes to preserve
prior practice might result in some improvements. Ordinarily,
it seems best to make changes only if they seem to offer very
appreciable advantages.
Complete coverage of all Michigan revisions of the federal
rules could be only cursory. Consequently, attention will be
focused on the rules which are effective prior to trial, and, even
so, only the most important revisions of the federal rules in this
area can be discussed. 5

II.

COMMENCEMENT OF SUIT, SERVICE OF PROCESS,
AND JURISDICTION

Since Federal Rule 4 is designed to deal with problems of
service of process that arise from the organization of the federal
court system and the jurisdictional requirements for suit in federal
Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85 (1959). For criticism of the newly revised
New York rules system, which does not follow the federal rules system, see Clark, Two
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 435, 447-51 (1958).
5 The Michigan rules and statutes are analyzed in detail for Michigan lawyers in
two sources. JOINT COMMITrEE ON MICHIGAN PROCEDURAL REVISION, FINAL REPORT pts.
I-III (1960) (Part III of this report is hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT); 1 HoNIGMAN &:
HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT Rut.ES ANNOTATED (1962) (hereinafter cited as HONIGMAN &:
HAWKINS). A preliminary repon of the joint committee is also helpful. Joint Committee
on Michigan Procedural Revision, Michigan Procedural Revision: A Partial Set of Rules,
Mich. S.B.J., Jan. 1959, p. 7. Several articles and comments furnish backgxound for
certain of the new Michigan rules. Blume, The Scope of a Cause of Action-Elimination
of the Splitting Trap, Mich. S.B.J., Dec. 1959, p. 10; Joiner &: Miller, Rules of Practice
and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REv. 624 (1957); Joiner
&: Geddes, The Union of Law and Equity, 55 MICH. L. REv. 1059 (1957); Miller, Splitting
a Cause of Action Under the New Michigan Court Rules: Alternative Interpretations, 8
WAYNE L. R.Ev. 497 (1962); Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pts. 1-2),
55 MrcH. L. REv. 327, 483 (1957); Comment, Preliminary Motion Practice Under the
Michigan General Court Rules of 1963, 8 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 399 (1962); Comment, Pre-Trial
Deposition and Discovery Under the Michigan General Court Rules of 1963, 8 WAYNE
L. REv. 417 (1962); Comment, Joinder of Parties and Claims Under the Michigan General
Court Rules of 1963, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 512 (1963); Comment, Venue and Jurisdiction
Under the Revised Judicature Act and General Court Rules of 1963, 8 WAYNE L. REv.
527 (1962); Comment, Pleading Under the Michigan General Court Rules of 1963, 8
WAYNE L. R.Ev. 542 (1962).
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district courts, most of the states which have adopted the federal
rules system have been forced to revise the rule. Similarly, rather
elaborate substituted provisions are included in the Michigan
rules and statutes. These are important for Michigan practice,
but they are fairly commonplace or involve innovations of minor
general importance. However, three matters concerning service
of process and jurisdiction merit extended consideration.

A. Out-of-State Service Statute
Statutory provisions include the substance of an Illinois statute that provides for obtaining personal jurisdiction by means of
personal service outside the state on nonresidents who have specified "contacts" with the state. 6 In separate sections relating to
acts of individuals or their agents, corporations or their agents,
partnerships or their agents, and partnership associations or unincorporated voluntary associations or their agents, the Michigan
statute specifies that personal jurisdiction may be obtained with
respect to the transaction of any business within the state, the
commission of a tortious act or receipt of an injury from such act
within the state, ownership, possession, or use of property within
the state, and contracting to insure persons, property or risks in
the state.7 These sections constitute a desirable elaboration of
the similar Illinois provision. 8
In addition to the above-mentioned sections, the Michigan
statute contains provisions which are not found in the Illin0is
statute. Contracting for services to be rendered or materials to be
furnished within the state is a basis for personal jurisdiction of all
of the types of defendants named above. Also, acting as a director,
manager, trustee, or officer of any Michigan corporation or any
foreign corporation whose principal office is located in the state
is ground for jurisdiction over nonresident individuals. 9 A supplementary rule provides for service of summons and complaint
outside of the state by the methods specified by the rules for ob6 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. llO, §§ 16-17 (1961). Similar statutes have been enacted in other
states: IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 5-514 to -517 (Supp. 1961); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16 (Supp.
1961); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw & RuLES § 302 (1962); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.28.180-.185 (1961);
and WIS. STAT. §§ 262.05-.06 (1961).
7 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.705, .715, .725, .735 (1961).
s The Illinois statute merely refers to "any person." It does not include the clause
that receipt of an injury from a tortious act may be the basis of personal jurisdiction,
but refers only to the commission of a tortious act within the state. ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. llO, § 17 (1961). The Michigan reference to receipt of injury in the state codifies an
Illinois decision interpreting the Illinois clause. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
9 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.705.
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taining personal jurisdiction of persons served within the state.10
Recent studies of the constitutionality of such statutes and of
their application in particular instances are found elsewhere,11
and the constitutional problems presented will not be re-examined
here.
A vast array of questions concerning the meaning of the provisions outlining the jurisdictional bases are unanswered. For
example, what type of interests in property held by a nonresident
will bring defendants within the provision concerning ownership,
possession or use of local property? Conceding that a nonresident
has the requisite interest in local property, what must be the
relation between his interest and the subject matter of a suit
brought against him? Obviously, the utility of out-of-state service
statutes is only presently affected by these and other unsolved
questions which will ultimately be answered by the courts.
The Michigan statutory wording which deviates from language of the Illinois statute raises similar questions. In a case
which involves substantial but incidental performance of a contract in Michigan, will the statute preclude a contention that
there has been a transaction of business in Michigan, under the
general clause referring to the transaction of any business, because of the existence of the more specific clause relating to performance of contracts in Michigan-the clause concerning contracts for services to be rendered or materials to be furnished in the
st'ate?12 Does this latter clause refer to any contract which happens
to involve the prescribed performance in Michigan, although performance in Michigan is not necessarily intended by the parties?
What actions of a nonresident officer of a corporation with its
10 "Service of a summons and a copy of the complaint, as hereinbefore provided,
shall confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant having any of the contacts, ties,
or relations with this state as specified in RJA Chapter 7, by giving notice to the
defendant of the pendency of the action and an opportunity to defend. There is no
territorial limitation on the range of the service of such notice." MICH. RuLE 105.9.
Rule 105.2, and RJA (Revised Judicature Act) ch. 19, § 1913, contain a special provision under which nonresidents may be served by personal service within the state upon
an agent, employee, representative, salesman, or servant of the nonresident. Process must
also be mailed by registered mail to the defendant at his last known address.
11 Cleary &: Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L.
REv. 599 (1955); Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern
Trends, 5 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 198 (1958); Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local
Causes of Action, 1956 WIS. L. REv. 522 (1956); O'Connor &: Goff, Expanded Concepts of
State Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act, 31 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 223 (1955); Comment, 34: ROCKY MT. L. REv. 359 (1962).
12 The specific clause reads: "Entering into a contract for services to be rendered
or for materials to be furnished in the state by the defendant." MICH. STAT. ANN
§§ 27A.705, .715, .725, .735 (1961).
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principal office in Michigan will subject him to personal jurisdiction? Such problems should not deter plaintiffs from using the
statute in many situations. The elaborate Michigan provisions outlined above seem preferable to the more scanty provisions of the
Illinois statute.
None of the general out-of-state service statutes, including
the Michigan statute, deal adequately with interesting theories
of interpretation which would extend the scope of the jurisdictional bases of such statutes to divorce suits. Whenever a divorce
action is brought against a husband who is currently a nonresident
on grounds which involve acts of a tortious nature which have
previously been committed within the state, it is possible to take
the position that the divorce suit involves the commission of a
tort within the terms of the statutes. Thus, jurisdiction to render
a valid personal judgment for alimony or support payments could
be obtained by service on a nonresident husband outside the
state.13 In Michigan, Rule 723 might also be somewhat pertinent,
since it provides that in divorce suits plaintiff shall cause process
to be served in accordance with Rules 105 and 106.14 Rule 105.9
provides for service outside the state under the jurisdictional
statute.
Constitutional arguments against the use of the statutes in
divorce cases might well be overcome, but important questions of
statutory interpretation remain. In states in which spouses cannot
sue each other for torts, it is rather unrealistic to classify any of
their acts as tortious for the instant purpose. Even if tort actions
between spouses are permitted, the above suggestion goes beyond
the language of the statutes, for they seem to encompass only actions
which have been traditionally labeled "tort" actions. Divorce
actions in which alimony or support is sought have not been so
categorized. 16 Furthermore, the grounds for divorce actions are
specified by the legislature, whether or not such grounds are
tortious. The fact that such grounds may create civil liability
by virtue of an independent field of law-the law of torts-is immaterial, as a logical matter, to a suit for divorce. Likewise, the
right to alimony is usually considered statutory; it is not founded
on tort law.
13 This theory has been accepted by a Washington trial court. Stem v. Stern, Civil
No. 569793, King County Super. Ct., Aug. 21, 1961.
H MICH. RULE 723.
15 For a succinct history of subject of divorce, see MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 256-63 (1931).
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There is a less plausible theory to support the notion that if
the marriage occurred within the state a resident spouse can obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse in a divorce
case. In this situation it might be argued that the divorce suit
is an action arising out of a transaction within the state.
From some viewpoints a marriage involves a contract, but essentially it is a status or relation which is not governed by contract
law.16 However, even if it is considered a contractual relationship
or if its creation is accomplished merely by means of a contract,
a marriage does not appear to be a "transaction" as that word is
used in the out-of-state service statutes. "Transaction" has usually
meant a business transaction of some kind.17 The thought that
the subject matter of a divorce action arises out of the "transaction" of marriage also overlooks the fact that divorce may be
had only on specified grounds, and not merely because there is a
marriage.
Thus, the present general out-of-state service statutes do not
appear to cover divorce suits. However, the need for personal
jurisdiction for alimony and support orders in suits against nonresident husbands justifies consideration of appropriate statutory
provisions to satisfy the need.
Having first outlined a broad policy that in specified situations it is fair for Michigan residents to bring suit in Michigan
courts against nonresidents, the draftsmen of the Michigan statute in its final form tacked on a provision that deters resort to
the statute. It states that, upon motion of defendant, plaintiff
must post a bond in a sum approved by the court. If plaintiff
does not obtain judgment, "so much of the penalty of said bond
as may be required shall be applied to the satisfaction of any
judgment for court costs and to defray the actual expenses of such
defendant incurred in defending the action (but not to include
attorney's fees).'' 18 If plaintiff obtains judgment, the reasonable
expense of procuring the bond may be taxed as costs to defendant.
Presumably one purpose of the out-of-state service statute is
to make suit against nonresidents convenient for Michigan plaintiffs. This purpose is nullified to a certain extent by the bond
provision. In all but the clearest cases plaintiff will run the risk
of posting bond and the further risk that the penalty of the bond
16

Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).

17 See Comment, supra note 11.
18 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.741 (1961).
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will be applied to defray defendant's expenses. Thus, it appears
that a prospective plaintiff will be required to compare in advance
his probable expenses of suit in Michigan, including expenses
arising as a result of the bond provision, with his probable expenses if suit is brought elsewhere. It may be difficult to make
this comparison in many instances. The result may be that certain claims which are more than colorable will not be instituted
in Michigan by use of out-of-state service. The bond provision
may tend to relegate use of the statute to types of cases in which
there is likely to be a default judgment. Moreover, the bond
provision is illogical. It does not take into account the fact that
defendant would have incurred expenses if he had been sued in
his own state.
Eventually, many states will probably enact a broad out-ofstate service statute, and there is no assurance that similar conditions will be enacted to protect Jv!ichigan residents and corporations who are sued under such statutes outside of Michigan. 10
Finally, at the present writing the bond provision does not seem
to be required to ensure the constitutionality of the statute. Thus,
it appears desirable to omit such a provision.
It must be conceded that the bond provision will result in
more equitable treatment of nonresidents. Since the bond penalty
operates "in the event judgment is not rendered in favor of the
plaintiff," it discourages use of the statute in suits which are basically groundless and are brought only in hope of a settlement. It
seems more sensible and logical than a provision in the Washington out-of-state service statute which requires the losing plaintiff
to pay reasonable attorney fees of defendant's attorney.20
As mentioned above, when jurisdiction is based on the Michigan statute, service of process may be had in the manner provided
for service to obtain personal jurisdiction within the state. Although substituted service is narrowly restricted in Michigan,
this Michigan provision suggests that other states should consider
enacting, in connection with an out-of-state service statute, a provision for substituted service at the home of a nonresident individual.21 Except for the bond provision the Michigan statute
(with related rule provisions) is an excellent model. 22
The statutes cited in note 6 supra do not include any similar bond provision.
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.185 (1961).
21 Except in Michigan and Wisconsin, only personal service is authorized by outof-state service statutes. See statutes cited in note 6 supra.
22 Appropriate venue and statute of limitations provisions are included in the
Michigan statutes. MrcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.1601-27, .5853 (1961). The statutes do
10

20
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B. Substituted Service at the Defendant's Abode
The joint committee which drafted the Michigan rules proposed a rule providing for substituted service upon an individual
in Michigan by service upon a member of his family of suitable
age and discretion at his usual place of abode, so long as plaintiff
authorized such service and also mailed a copy of summons and
complaint to the usual place of abode.23 New to Michigan, this
proposal was disapproved by legislative action. 24 This rejection
may have resulted from the fear that the proposed substituted
service rule could be the subject of abuse, in some instances, even
though it was more restricted than provisions for substituted service in many other states. In spite of such a fear, similar provisions
have not been subject to criticism in other states. The fact is that
most attorneys prefer to take the conservative action of attempting
to obtain personal service before resorting to substituted service.
The availability of such a mqde of service helps to ensure that
"process-dodging" tactics will be unsuccessful.

C. Discretion of Trial Courts To Authorize Any Type
of Constitutional Service of Process
Another noteworthy service of process provision is found in
Rule 105.8. This rule states that a court may in its discretion
allow service of process to be made upon a defendant in any manner that is reasonably calculated to give defendant actual notice
of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. An order
permitting such service must be entered before actual service of
process. To secure the order, plaintiff must show that service of
process cannot reasonably be made in the manner outlined in
other rules. 25 The rule was designed to authorize a trial court
to permit, upon the appropriate showing, any means of service
which might be constitutional under decided cases.26 It ensures
not contain a provision dealing with attempts to join other claims with claims which
are clearly within the statute. The Illinois statute restricts joinder of claims to claims
arising from acts enumerated by the statute. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. llO, § 17 (1961).
23 FINAL REPORT 12.
24 1 HONIGMAN &: HAWKINS 77. Michigan is one of three states without provision for
substituted service of this type. FINAL REPORT 14.
25 "The court in which an action has been commenced may, in its discretion, allow
service of process to be made upon a defendant in any other manner which is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard, if an order permitting such service is entered before service of process is made
upon showing to the court that service of process cannot reasonably be made in the
manner provided for under other rules." MICH. RuLE 105.8.
26 FINAL REPORT 20.
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state authorization for constitutional service in addition to statutory service that might prove to be unconstitutional.27
This purpose of securing utilization of newly approved or
other constitutional service can be better accomplished by promulgation of amendments to the rules from time to time. Promulgation of amendments ensures centralized control of new
methods of service and provides adequate notification to all attorneys in the state. Uniformity of decision is also promoted.
Finally, to the extent that the instant rule is operative only at
the trial court level, no statewide policy decision is made. It may
well be that, as a matter of state policy, not all constitutional
methods of service should be utilized.

III.

PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS

A. Order and Arrangement of Content

Much of the substance of the federal rules concerning pleadings and motions has been retained in the new Michigan rules,
but arrangement of content has been altered substantially. This
arrangement seems less convenient than the simple order of statement in the federal rules. All of the time limitations for motions
and pleadings are collected in the rule otherwise analogous to
Federal Rule 6.28 Counterclaims are treated in the rule governing
joinder of claims, with the exception of one paragraph inexplicably included in the rule covering general rules of pleading.29 The
general subject matter of Federal Rules 12 and 56 is included in
four rules, only three of which are numbered consecutively.30 In
fact, all of the Michigan rules, including the pleading rules, are
numbered by a system which does not correspond to the federal
system.31
The arrangement and the numbering of the new procedural
rules which substantially incorporate the federal rules are not inconsequential matters; the rules should be numbered to encourage reference to the analogous federal rules. Such reference must
be encouraged because many attorneys have only occasional reason
to use new rules. As a matter of fact, some attorneys with con!?7 1 HONIGMAN &: HAWKINS 114.
!?8 MICH. RULE 108.
!?O MICH. RuLE 203 governs joinder

of claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims. MICH.
RuLE 111.8 provides that a counterclaim may exceed an opposing claim in amount.
30 Similar in content to Federal Rules 12 and 56 are Michigan Rules 111 (in part),
115, 116, and 117 (in part).
81 For example, the rules similar to Federal Rules 6 through 13 are numbered
Michigan Rules 107 through 109.
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siderable trial work may treat new rules with cavalier abandon
if they read them at all. 32 This is possible because former methods
of practice are available, at least in part, even after the federal
rules system has been adopted.
B. Changes in Federal Rules To Preserve Prior Practice
Fact Pleading. Retention of "fact pleading" in Michigan
seems to require more specific pleading than is necessary under
the federal rules. To the extent this conclusion is correct, Michigan Rule 111 is not compatible with the philosophy of the federal
rules.
Prior requirements for "fact pleading" of a "cause of action"
are retained by the provision of Rule 111 which states that a
pleading "which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain ...
a statement of the facts without repetition upon which the pleader
relies in stating his cause of action with such specific averments
as are necessary reasonably to inform the adverse party of the
nature of the cause he is called upon to defend . . . ." 33 This
provision is reinforced by Rule 115, which provides for a motion
for more definite statement if "a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that it fails to comply with the requirements of the rules." 84
Rule 115 also provides that any part of any pleading may be
stricken if it is "not drawn in conformity to these rules." 35
Mr. Honigman and Professor Hawkins, two leading commentators on the new Michigan rules, state that, "unless an unintended
regression from prior practice is to be read into the new rule,"
the clause of Rule 111 concerning specific averments "must be
taken as modifying that which precedes it-that is, as prescribing
the purpose or end to which the pleader is required to state a
32 Mr. Philip S. Van Cise, who was the chief proponent of a system similar to the
federal rules adopted in Colorado, sent a questionnaire to all judges in Colorado ten
years after the system patterned on the federal rules became effective in that state. On
the basis of the resulting data and his own extensive experience, he summarized
Colorado's ten-year experience as follows: "Have they [the federal rules] improved
the practice of law; are they of value to litigants; have they shortened the length of
trials and facilitated compromises? The answer to these four questions is yes-if the
lawyers and judges really know the Rules and properly apply them in court. The trouble
is that many of both groups have not really studied the Rules and do not apply them."
Van Cise, The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 RocKY MT. L. REV. 527, 528 (1951).
A standard joke in states which have promulgated an entire set of new rules concerns
the law professor who asked the trial judge how the new rules were operating in his
county. The judge replied, "Fine. They are causing no problems at all. No one is paying
any attention to them."
33 MICH. RULE 111.1.
34 MICH. RULE 115.1.
35 MICH. RULE 115.2.
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'cause of action.' " 36 Thus, these commentators conclude that the
rule emphasizes the notice function of the complaint and expeditious disposition of frivolous or legally hopeless claims.37 It is
further suggested that prior rules worked "quite well" and that
it was "not necessary ... to adopt new language and possibly write
new interpretation and resulting confusion.'' 38 They also suggest
that the Michigan Supreme Court has been liberal in these respects, and that "for the most part Michigan practice establishes
that a complaint cannot be dismissed because its allegations are
insufficient to cover all the technical elements of a cause of action,
so long as the facts which might be proved under the pleading
could qualify the pleader for relief.'' 39 Finally, it is stated that
in recent years no appellate decision sanctions the dismissal of a
complaint for pleading evidentiary facts nor, for the most part,
has the Supreme Court recently seized upon lack of specificity or
defective draftsmanship to avoid the merits by the device of labeling allegations as insufficient because they were "conclusions." 40
Despite these observations it appears that, at least for the present, Michigan has rejected in part the philosophy of the function
of the complaint which is embodied in Federal Rule S(a).41 The
distinction between "ultimate facts," "evidential facts" and "conclusions" is apparently preserved to some extent. Undoubtedly,
the Michigan Supreme Court has shown a liberal attitude in interpreting complaints, but even recent cases show retention of
the concept that proper "fact" allegations must be allegations of
"ultimate facts" and not allegations of "legal conclusions" nor allegations of "evidential facts." 42 It might also be pertinent to observe
1 HoNIGMAN &: HAWKINS 196.
Id. at 196-97.
38 Id. at 198.
30 Id. at 197.
40 Id. at 197-98.
41 Under Rule 8(a) of the federal rules, technical distinctions between ultimate
facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions are abolished. A restricted use of the motion
for more definite statement is contemplated. Evidential facts should not be stricken
because they are evidential. See the short explanation and authorities cited in Meisenholder, The Effect of Proposed Rules 7 Through 25 on Present Washington Procedures,
32 WASH. L. R.Ev. 219, 230-32, 261-63 (1957). At the same time, a motion to dismiss
should be granted -under the federal rules unless it appears certain that no state of
facts entitling plaintiff to relief could be proved under the statements in the complaint.
Sec cases collected in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2245-46 n.6 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
MooRE]. Official forms indicate that statements may be quite general. FED. R. ClV. P.
App. of Forms.
42 The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that the court is "committed to the
notice theory of pleading," and that "no declaration shall be deemed insufficient which
shall contain such information as shall reasonably inform the defendant of the nature
of the case he is called upon to defend." Baker v. Gushwa, 354 Mich. 241, 246, 92
36
37
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that, in states requiring a complaint to state facts, it is not uncommon to find trial judges occasionally enforcing these distinctions
and specificity of pleading more strictly than seems warranted by
statements in the opinions of the appellate courts of the state.
On its face, Rule 115.2 authorizes a motion to strike "evidential facts" because it authorizes the striking of any part of a pleading "not drawn in conformity to these rules." And since by definition "legal conclusions" are not "ultimate facts," it appears that
a motion for more definite statement under Rule 115 can be used
to attack allegations of such conclusions on the simple basis that
such conclusions have been stated. In fact, it is arguable that the
motion may be used to force particularized statements of fact in
accord with the usual practice in most code pleading states. In
other words, it seems that the motion for a more definite statement may be used to attack allegations of "ultimate facts" in various instances.43 The joint committee has commented that the
test for the motion "is based upon whether the adverse party can
N.W.2d 507, 510 (1958). See also Jean v. Hall, 364 Mich. 434, 111 N.W.2d 111 (1961);
Manley, Bennett & Co. v. Woodhams, 349 Mich. 586, 84 N.W.2d 771 (1957).
Nevertheless, the distinctions mentioned in the text have recently furnished problems
on appeal and are apparently regarded as pertinent at the trial court level. A long
quotation stating the distinctions is approved in Steed v. Covey, 355 Mich. 504, 94
N.W.2d 864 (1959). In Roblyer v. Hoyt, 343 Mich. 431, 72 N.W.2d 126 (1955), the court
held that a complaint for malicious prosecution was insufficient because an allegation
that defendants acted without probable cause was merely a conclusion of law and there
were no allegations of fact sufficient to support the conclusion. However, by proper
reference to facts submitted in support of a motion to dismiss, the court found that
there was probable cause. It is likely that the general allegation of lack of probable
cause is sufficient in a complaint under Federal Rule 8(a). See the form located at 1
BENDER'S FEDERAL PRACTICE FORMS 489 (1963). Such an allegation is quoted with approval
in Riegel v. Hygrade Seed Co., 47 F. Supp. 290 (W.D.N.Y. 1942), and is conceded to be
good, for purposes of argument, without deciding the point raised, in Leggett v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 178 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1949).
In Koebke v. La Buda, 339 Mich. 569, 64 N.W.2d 914 (1954), the court stated that
allegations that defendant held property in trust for plaintiff and that deceased's minor
son stood in relationship of loco parentis to a party were insufficient conclusions. In
more recent cases, part of the opinions are devoted to contentions that certain allegations were statements of conclusions and not facts. See, e.g., Frazier v. Ford Motor Co.,
364 Mich. 648, 112 N.W.2d 80 (1961); Pfaffenberger v. Pavilion Restaurant Co., 352 Mich.
1, 88 N.W.2d 488 (1958). And the opinion in In re Del Monte's Estate, 340 Mich. 165, 65
N.W.2d 309 (1954), indicates details which a trial court thought should have been
pleaded. Its conclusions were reversed on appeal.
43 "In cases where the bill of particulars is now used to state details, this motion
[motion for more definite statement] will be in order." FINAL REPORT 49.
"Michigan Rule 111 sets up more specific pleading standards than the Federal
Rules. • . . The phrase 'failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules' thus
makes it clear that it is the more specific standards of the Michigan Rules, and not the
possibly looser standard of federal practice, that are to determine the adequacy of a
pleading and its consequent susceptibility to a demand for a more definite statement."
1 HONIGMAN & HAWKINS 285.
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reasonably be expected to frame a responsive pleading thereto." 44
This statement does not appear to mean that the test is the same
as the test for the similar federal motion, because the committee
then states that the motion will lie when a bill of particulars has
been in order. 45 Furthermore, the test stated in the federal rule
was actually deleted from Rule 115.
The many extended written discussions of the nature and
advantages of the pleading concepts embodied in Rule 8(a) will
not be repeated. 46 Rather, the point here made is that Michigan
has chosen to retain a system which differs from the federal rule
in emphasis. To some extent, the advantages of Rule 8(a) (if one
concedes that there are advantages) will not be realized.
When all the arguments for so-called "fact" and "cause of
action" pleading are stripped of frills and verbiage, such pleading
is primarily justified by notions that it ensures more "firming" of
fact issues (including detailed issues) by the pleadings and that it
enables opponents to "pin" each other down on those issues by
the pleadings. That these results occur in a particular case is
often questionable. That these functions should be the primary
goal of pleading has often been questioned. 47 Certainly the federal
pleading rules were designed to de-emphasize these functions of
the complaint and answer. 48 Comparatively speaking, the Michigan rules seem to emphasize these functions.
The above observations concerning the Michigan rules may
be somewhat overstated because of the writer's lack of knowledge
of actual practice in Michigan. In such case it should be concluded that, if the draftsmen of Rules 111 and 115 intended to
make federal requirements for a complaint effective, they could
have accomplished such a result very clearly by adopting Federal
Rule 8(a) and related rules without change. Confusion has not
resulted from such a course of action in other states.49 Designed
to incorporate existing Michigan practice, the above-mentioned
44 FINAL REPORT 49.
415 See note 43 supra.
40 See, e.g., IA BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE § 255 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTZOFF]; 2 M:ooRE 1692-1721.
47 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION INSTITUTE, FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 219-25 (Cleveland 1938).
48 Ibid.
49 For example, see comments in Clay, May the Federal Civil Rules Be Successfully
Adopted To Improve State Procedure?, 24 F.R.D. 437, 439-40 (1959). It is important
to note that, after adoption of Federal Rule S(a), complaints may still be drafted in
accordance with code pleading principles. Federal Rule S(a) permits, but does not
require, new types of allegations.
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Michigan rules seem to have no utility, in any event, as models
for other states.
Pleading Matter in Support of Denials. That the philosophy
of pleading under the federal rules is somewhat different from the
basic concepts embodied in the Michigan rules is also indicated
by the retention of another prior Michigan procedure in Rule
lll.4 This rule emphasizes the fact-issue-forming function of
· pleadings by retaining a former provision that in connection with
every denial the pleader shall set forth the substance of the matters on which he will rely to support such denial. 50
Taken from the rules of the Michigan Railroad Commission,
this rule was first proposed by the Michigan Procedure Commission in 1929 with the comment, "It would seem to have great
possibilities for disclosing meritorious defenses and exposing fictitious defenses." 51 The Michigan Supreme Court has stated very
specifically that the purpose of the rule concerning denials is to
"pin down" the defendant and point up exact fact issues:
"The latter part of section 2 of rule 23 provides that in connection with every denial the answer shall set forth the substance of the matters which will be relied upon to support
such denial. The purpose of the rule is to narrow the issue
solely to facts in dispute and to make it unnecessary to prove
those matters upon which there should be no dispute. The
main purpose of a lawsuit is to elicit the truth, and when the
facts are known to either side and do not admit of any dispute, they should be frankly stated so as to make it unnecessary for the opposite party to offer proof as to such facts and
thus also save the time of the court. This is especially true
in cases involving breach of contracts where all the elements
entering into the contract should be fully and freely brought
out by declaration and answer so that the issue may be limited
to the sole point or points over which there is a dispute. A
stricter observance of the rule is exacted in assumpsit than
in tort where frequently most of the facts are very much in
dispute. The rule does not make the declaration a bill for
discovery, nor does it require the defendant to produce its
evidence prior to trial. It, however, does require in tort cases
the setting forth of the substance of the matters which will
be relied upon to support a denial. There can be no specific
formula set forth as to what the answer should contain in a
50 MICH. RuLE lll.4. This rule is the same as former Michigan Rule 23.
43 (1929).

51 MICHIGAN PROCEDURE COMM'N, FINAL AMENDED REPORT
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denial in a tort case and the sufficiency of the answer largely
must rest within the sound discretion of the circuit judge."52

If this statement is at all accurate, the emphasis placed by the
instant provision upon the answer as a means of forming detailed
fact issues is greater in Michigan than in many code pleading
states. To the extent the rule is operative (and it should be emphasized the writer is not acquainted with actual practice in Michigan trial courts), it is a partial throwback to Pomeroy's notion that
the pleadings should set forth the "naked facts" in order to indicate fact issues. The rule is at the least inconsistent in spirit with
current concepts of the function of the complaint and answer
under the federal rules system, and, for that matter, with the remainder of the federal rules system which has been adopted in
Michigan.
These conclusions are supported by a further rule providing
that defendant shall explicitly admit or deny each averment of the
complaint (or plead "no contest"). It should be added, however,
that defendant may plead he is without knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of an averment. Such an
allegation has the effect of a denial.53
Additional Issue Pleading Devices. Two additional former
rules also emphasize the pleading functions of forming fact issues
and "pinning down" the opponent. Rule 113 provides that, whenever a claim or defense is founded upon a ·written instrument
other than an insurance policy, a copy of the instrument or its
pertinent parts shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit
unless specified excuses are stated in the pleading.54 Rule 602
provides that the plaintiff need not prove the execution of an
instrument or the handwriting of the defendant in an action on
the instrument unless the defendant files with his answer an affidavit denying the execution or handwriting.55
If the federal rules are to be adopted in any state, it seems
preferable to use the federal pleading rules without the addition
of various "tight" pleading requirements. This conclusion has
been reached in practically all of the states which have adopted
the entire federal rules system.
52 Miller v. General Motors Corp., 279 Mich. 240, 243-44, 271 N.W. 746, 747 (1937).
53 MICH. RULES 111.2, lll.4.
54 MICH. RuLE 113.4 (formerly Rule 17, § 5).
55 MICH. RuLE 602 (formerly Rule 29). The period for filing the affidavit may be
extended.
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"Bad Faith" Pleading. Another related former rule was retained and expanded. Rule 111.6 provides: "If it appears at the
trial that any fact alleged or denied by a pleading ought not to
have been so alleged or denied and such fact if alleged is not
proved or if denied is approved or admitted, the court may, if
the allegation or denial is unreasonable, require the party making
such allegation or denial to pay to the adverse party the reasonable expenses incurred in proving or preparing to prove or disprove such fact as the case may be, including reasonable attorney
fees." 56 The rule formerly applied only to denials.57 It is obviously designed to discourage "bad faith" pleadings.58
Several objections to the rule are patent. It disregards the
practical problem of the lawyer who must begin suit without
complete pre-suit investigation. Strict application of the rule
would require such investigation prior to suit. In many cases
such a practice would be wasteful of both time and money. In
fact, from this standpoint it is inconsistent with the discovery
rules which afford official investigation techniques only after the
complaint is drafted and the suit is commenced. On the face of
the rule, it might be possible for an attorney to sign a complaint
in good faith under Rule 114 (similar to Federal Rule 11) only
to be met at trial with sanctions against his client under this rule.
Additionally, the rule does not recognize the fact that the attorney
is responsible for the pleadings under Rule 114. When the substance of Federal Rule 11 has been promulgated, it is more sensible to penalize the attorney for bad faith than to penalize the
client. Also, the rule is expressed in wholly ambiguous terms,
such as "ought not" and "unreasonable." And, in addition, attorneys not familiar with Michigan practice would probably guess
that in many instances enforcement is not sought for various practical reasons.
The chief matter of interest in the context of the previous discussion of other pleading rules is whether Rule 111.6 will tend
to motivate draftsmen of complaints to be more specific or more
general. It seems probable that the rule is inoperative in this
respect, but that, if it has any effect, it motivates more specific
pleading and tends to "strait-jacket" complaints. Two other states
111.6.
Fonner Michigan Rule 17.
58 The former rule was proposed in 1929 to discourage denials made in bad faith.
MICHIGAN PROCEDURE CoMM'N, FINAL AimNDED REPORT 36 (1929).
56 MICH. RULE
57
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which require fact pleading have enacted a similar provision.59
Federal Rule 11, unsupported by a provision similar to Michigan Rule 111.6, appears to provide a much more practical means
of securing good faith pleading. At the same time, it is more
consistent with the goal that complaints may be fairly general and
need not necessarily contain technical "ultimate" facts.
Compulsory Counterclaims. Federal Rule 13(a), concerning
compulsory counterclaims,60 was originally included in the proposed rules by the joint committee, but it was not incorporated
in the :final draft submitted to the Michigan Supreme Court. 61
If a federal rule has not been effective in a state jurisdiction,
a proposal that it be adopted may arouse fear and trepidation on
the part of various members of a state bar in view of the drastic
nature of the change in practice which the rule would seem to
make. In Michigan, Professor Blume stated that a compulsory
counterclaim rule "multiplies the dangers of lawyers losing claims
by procedural errors." 62 In answer to such a charge, it should be
pointed out that the compulsory counterclaim is not a new, strange,
and untried device. Not only has it worked well in practice in federal courts, but also it has been in effect in a few code pleading
states. 83 Nor can the above charge of danger be supported by substantial statistics.
The most obvious objection to the device is that a defendant
may not know that he has a matured claim which relates to the
subject matter of the suit against him. And even more important,
although defendant may know of such a claim, he may not be
aware of its significance under the compulsory counterclaim rule.
For these reasons, as well as others, defendant's attorney may never
learn of the claim.
However, if the federal compulsory counterclaim rule is in
effect, the dangers may be overcome by pertinent investigation
on the part of defendants' attorneys prior to answer. Federal Rule
119 CONN. GEN. STAT.

ch. 898, § 52-99 (1959);

ILL.

R.Ev.

STAT.

ch. 110, § 41 (1961).

oo "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not be so stated if at the time the
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action." FED. R.
CIV. P. 13(a).
61 1 HONIGMAN & HAWKINS 479.
02 Blume, The Scope of a Cause of Action-Elimination of the Splitting Trap,
Mich. S.B.J., Dec. 1959, pp. 10, 11.
03 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 646 n.54 (1947) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
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13(£) also affords a substantial safeguard to defendant, for it provides that, when a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of the court set up the counterclaim by
amendment. 64 This rule has been construed liberally. 05 Indeed,
one federal court even permitted an omitted permissive counterclaim to be made after answer although it was not due to any
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. 66 On a sufficient
showing it might be possible to set up such a counterclaim after
judgment.67 In some cases it may be questionable whether or not
a particular counterclaim arises out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of plaintiff's suit and is therefore a compulsory counterclaim under the federal rule. This difficulty may be obviated by assertion of the counterclaim, and, if
trial of the counterclaim with the original claim is inconvenient,
a separate trial can be ordered. 68
On a more general basis, the compulsory counterclaim rule
tends to accomplish the basic philosophy that a multiplicity of
suits should be avoided if possible. If the federal rules system is to
be used as a model, the compulsory counterclaim rule should be
considered an integral part of that system.
Other Changes. The pleading and motion rules contain various other changes that were made to retain former Michigan
practice, but for the most part the changes are of minor general
importance. 69
C. Innovations in Former Michigan Rules and the Federal Rules
In other jurisdictions which have adopted the federal rules
system, newly devised changes from the federal rules and former
state practice are rare. This course was not followed in drafting
the Michigan pleading rules; they contain several important innovations.
Defenses and Objections. The Michigan pleading rules contain a particularly interesting attempt to ii:nprove the statement
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(£).
3 MOORE 89.
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Shepard, 13 F.R.D. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
IA BARRON &: HOLTZOFF § 402, at 627-28.
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
69 Some of the additional changes which favor prior practice are as follows. Special
provision is made for pleading upon a policy of insurance. MICH. RULE 112.4. Hypothetical
allegations are not authorized. Also omitted is the provision of Federal Rule 8(e) which
states that a pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one of two alternative
statements. A bond may be required of plaintiff. MICH. RuLE 109.
64
65
66
67
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and content of procedures which are outlined in Federal Rules
12 and 56.
Of course, Federal Rule 12 provides that all defenses and objections shall be made for the first time in the answer. 70 However,
it further provides that the defenses and objections relating to
lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, failure to state a claim, and failure
to join an indispensable party may be made by motion prior to
answer. 71 If objections going to jurisdiction over the person or
to improper venue are not made by motion when any of the above
objections are so made, or if either of these two objections are
not made by answer when no motion is made prior to answer,
they are waived.72 The remainder of the objections listed above
cannot be waived in the pleading stages of a suit. 73 Whenever
any of the objections which can be made by motion or answer
are so made, such objections can be set for hearing prior to trial. 74
Motions for judgment on the pleadings, to strike, and for more
definite statement are also "authorized.75 Finally, by motion of the
parties and permission of the judge, a motion prior to answer on
the ground that the complaint does not state a claim may be
treated as a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule
56.76 Federal Rule 56 spells out the requirements for summary
judgment. Rules 12 and 56 thus state a relatively simple plan
for assertion and disposal of major defenses prior to trial.
The Michigan rules substitute four rules for Federal Rules 12
and 56. In part these rules retain prior Michigan practice. First,
it is provided that all defenses except lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter and failure to state a claim are waived unless made
in the answer or by preliminary motion.77 By separate rule, Rule
116, it is provided that the following objections may be raised by
answer or motion prior to answer: (1) the court lacks jurisdiction
of the person or property, (2) the court lacks jurisdiction of the
subject matter, (3) the party asserting the claim lacks capacity to
sue, (4) another action is pending, (5) the claim is barred because
of release, payment, prior judgment, statute of limitations, statute
70 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b).
71 Ibid.
72 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(g), (h).
73 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h).

74 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(d).
711 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(c), (e), and (f).
76 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b).
77 MICH. RULE 111.3.
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of frauds, infancy or other disability of moving party or other disposition of the claim before commencement of the action. These
defenses by motion may be heard on affidavits and other evidence,
and the court may also order immediate trial of these defenses
when made by answer and render judgment on them or postpone
the hearing until trial on the merits. If a jury trial is demanded
prior to the hearing on the defenses listed under (5) above, the
hearing must be postponed until trial on the merits. A defendant
may make no more than one motion under this rule, but he may
use any or all of the grounds listed above in support of the motion.
However, with one exception, a motion based upon any one or
more of such objections does not waive the right to make the remainder of such objections by answer. If the objection to lack
of jurisdiction over the person or property is not made when a
motion under the rule is first filecl, it is waived.78 Rule 116 is
entitled "accelerated judgment"; it is designed to afford adjudication of the listed defenses prior to a full trial on the merits. 79
Rule 117 then provides for a "motion for summary judgment."
This motion may be one for judgment because the complaint
does not state a claim on its face (or because the answer does not
state a valid defense), or because there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact. 80 Thus, in effect, the "motion for summary
judgment" will serve the same functions as a motion to dismiss
because no claim is stated under Federal Rule 12(b), a motion
for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule 12(c), and a
motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule 56.81 This
motion may be made by plaintiff after defendant responds to the
complaint by motion or answer and by defendant before or after
answer. Provisions similar to those stated in the federal summary
judgment rule are included. Provisions for affidavits are contained
in Rule 116. In contrast to Rule 116, Rule 117 is designed to
test the law of a plaintiff's case and the existence of factual disputes.82 And finally, as indicated in the first part of this article,
Rule 115 provides for a motion for more definite statement and
a motion to strike.
One principal change from the federal rules system is the addition of defenses which may be raised by motion (numbers (3), (4),
78 MICH. RULE 116.2.
79 1 HONIGMAN & HAWKINS
MICH. RULE 117.
81 FINAL REPORT 54.
1 HONIGMAN & HAWKINS

80
82

336-37.
358-59.
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and (5) above) to the defenses mentioned in Federal Rule 12(b).
In addition, as mentioned previously, it is specifically provided
that, in the discretion of the court, trial and judgment may be
had on these defenses prior to trial of the merits (if a jury is not
demanded on the defenses listed under (5) above). Defenses concerning jurisdiction and failure to state a claim can be handled
in the same way. Of course, under the federal rules defenses
going to jurisdiction, venue, failure to state a claim, and failure
to join an indispensable party may be disposed of prior to trial
on the merits under the terms of Federal Rule 12(c).
The mentioning of the additional defenses listed in Rule 116
seems desirable. Defenses such as lack of capacity to sue and the
bar of statutes of limitations have caused difficulty under the federal rules. However, it is difficult to find any advantage in the
other Michigan revisions of Federal Rules 12 and 56. There
seems to be no advantage in providing one rule for the defenses
listed under Rule 116, as summarized above, and a second rule
which makes separate provision for attack on the complaint, judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment. Moreover, the
rules fail to state how motions under one rule are related to motions under the other rule. Apparently there can be three stages
of motions prior to answer-a motion to strike or for more definite statement, a motion for accelerated judgment and a motion
for summary judgment. Furthermore, the changes in content of
Rules 12(b) and 56 could have been made within the order and
arrangement of Federal Rules 12 and 56. As it is, the rearrangement of the general content of Rules 12 and 56 in the Michigan
rules is not convenient for use in other states. 83
One other change from Federal Rule 12(b) and prior Michigan practice should be mentioned. The federal rule makes improper venue a defense to be raised under the rule by motion or
answer. The objection is waived if not made when a motion on
the other grounds listed in Rule 12(b) is made, or, if no such
motion is made, when the objection is not made in the answer. 84
The Michigan rules treat venue objections under separate rules
83 Additional changes in content from Federal Rules 12 and 56 are fully discussed
in Comment, Preliminary Motion Practice Under the Michigan General Court Rules
of 1963, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 399 (1962).
The provisions in the new New York rules for a motion to dismiss and a motion for
summary judgment are somewhat similar to the Michigan provisions. N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAW &: Ruus Art. 32, R. 3211-12 (1962).
84 Fm. R. CIV. P. 12(b), (g), (h).
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relating to venue.85 An objection to improper venue or a request
for change of venue properly laid (for convenience of witnesses,
etc.) must be made by a motion for change of venue filed before or
at the time defendant files an answer, or upon a "deferred motion"
after answer, "if the court is satisfied that the facts upon which
the deferred motion is based were not and could not with reasonable diligence have been known to the defendant until 10 days
prior to the motion." 86 If no motion is made within these temporal limitations, the right to change of venue is waived. 87
Federal Rule 12 only governs change of venue when venue is
improper and does not govern motions for change of venue when
it is properly laid. 88 This is an omission which should be remedied
when the rule is adopted for state practice. The Michigan device
of treating a motion for change of venue on any ground as a separate subject and creating a motion independent of other motions
is certainly feasible, but there seems to be very little reason to
deal with improper venue objections in a manner different from
procedures for objection to lack of jurisdiction over the person.
It seems desirable to retain the improper venue provision of Federal Rule 12(b). If this course is adopted, special provision must
be made for change of venue for convenience.80
Replies. The Michigan rules also contain an innovation regarding replies. A reply "to an answer demanding a reply" and
a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such are required. 00
This provision should be contrasted with Federal Rule 7 which
requires a reply to be made to a counterclaim denominated as
such, but otherwise does not require a reply unless ordered by
the court.91
If there is no counterclaim denominated as such, why should
a reply to an answer be required or be dispensed with at the whim
MICH. RULES 401-04.
MICH. RULES 401-02.
MICH. RULE 409.
Nowotny v. Turner, 203 F. Supp. 802 (M.D.N.C. 1962); Ferment-Acid Corp. v.
Miles Lab., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Spence v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 89 F. Supp.
823 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
so The time limits for a motion for change of venue for convenience or in the
interests of justice should probably be related in some way to possible delays of trial.
In "Washington, Federal Rule 12(b) was changed to cover motions for change of venue
for convenience of witnesses and in the interests of justice. This change seems to fix the
time limit too early in the suit. At the stage of answer it may not be clear that there
is reason for change of venue on these grounds.
90 MICH. RULE 110.1.
01 FED. R. Crv. P. 7.
85
86
87
88
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of defendant? Taken at face value, the rule allows a defendant
to state any defensive matter affirmatively in the answer even
though it could clearly be proved under an appropriate denial
and is not in any sense "new matter," and then authorizes defendant to require a reply of plaintiff to such matter. At the same
time, such allegations constituting argumentative denials are not
subject to a motion to strike under the federal rules. 92 The only
joint committee comment that has any bearing on this interpretation is a statement that, since a reply is required only when
demanded by the answer or when there is a counterclaim denominated as such, "there will be no reasonable excuse for failure to
file a required reply, since the plaintiff can easily ascertain from
his opponent's pleading whether one is necessary." 93 This may
be true, but by like token the rule seems to require a reply at the
option of defendant when there should not be a reply by any
standard of judgment. Also, if defendant does not demand a reply
to his answer, the joint committee suggests that plaintiff may still
file a reply to new matter in the answer. 94
Thus, this rule is a far cry from the federal rule concerning
replies to answers. The sensible theory which underlies the federal rule is based on the notion that the complaint and answer
are usually sufficient to give notice of plaintiff's claims and defendant's defenses in the absence of a counterclaim. If the court
can be convinced otherwise, it may order a reply to an answer. 95
"No Contest" Pleading. An innovation in defensive pleading
is made by a provision that a defendant may plead "no contest to
one or more of the claims or parts thereof stated against him." 96
It is further provided that such a plea permits the action to proceed without the necessity of proof of the claim or part thereof
to which such a plea has been made, and that the plea has the
effect of an admission for the purpose of the pending action only.97
According to the joint committee, this pleading is somewhat
analogous to a plea of nolo contendere in criminal proceedings.
92 2 MOORE 2320. See cases cited in IA BARRON & HoLTZOFF § 368, at 499 n.52.
However, the motion to strike may be available in this situation under the Michigan
rules.
93 FINAL REPORT 38.
94 Ibid.
95 See discussion in IA BARRON & HoLTZOFF § 243, at 13-14.
96 "Whenever a responsive pleading is required, the pleader shall either (1) set forth
an explicit admission or denial of each averment upon which the adverse party relies,
or (2) plead no contest to I or more of the claims or parts thereof stated against him."
MICH. RULE III.2.
07 MICH, RULE 111.5.
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It will admit liability in the specific case in which it is made; it
will establish defendant as a party entitled to notice of further
proceedings; and it will result in a judgment which has the res
judicata effect of a default judgment.98
It has been suggested by Mr. Honigman and Professor Hawkins
that in Michigan there is some room for doubt on the question of
whether a default judgment precludes litigation of common questions of fact in a subsequent case involving a different cause of
action.99 But they also take the position that the language of the
rule indicates that a fact to which a "no contest" plea is made is
open to litigation in a subsequent action on a different claim.100
It might be added that, if an analogy is to be made to the plea
of nolo contendere in a criminal case, the "no contest" rule
should have such an effect.101 It is also suggested that the rule is
justified by the notion that, "if the purpose of res judicata is to
conserve judicial energy, that purpose is better advanced by a
policy which encourages no contest over issues which are of no
importance except as they might become involved in collateral
proceedings."102
The "no contest" rule seems to be much broader than the
above observations indicate. It seems to do more than preclude
the operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in certain instances. The wording of the rule indicates that the pleading does
not constitute an admission which could be used as an evidential
admission in any other suit. This has been the usual result of a
plea of nolo contendere as well.103 It also appears that a pleading
of "no contest" could not be used as an inconsistent statement
to impeach the defendant as a witness in some other case.
Since the evident purpose of the rule is to permit the admission of facts in a particular suit by a method which would preclude the assertion of collateral estoppel in another case or
preclude the use of the pleading as an evidential admission, the
rule might afford undue tactical advantages to a defendant in
certain situations. Suppose that in separate suits brought by different plaintiffs the defendant is charged with acts which caused
98 FINAL REPORT 42-43.
99 1 HoNIGMAN 8:: HAWKINS
100 Id. at 200.
101 Lenvin 8:: Meyers, Nola

200-01.

Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 YALE L.J.
1255, 1263 (1942).
102 1 HoNIGMAN 8:: HAWKINS 201.
103 See 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1066, at 58 (3d ed. 1940); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law
§ 425(3) (1961).

1963]

NEW MICHIGAN PROCEDURAL RULES

1413

air or stream pollution injuring the property of the respective
plaintiffs. For tactical reasons having little to do with the actual
merits on the facts and law, he can plead "no contest" in certain
of the cases as to certain issues without prejudice to contrary positions in the remaining cases. Should the defendant have such an
advantage? In such types of cases there is a possibility that the
"no contest" rule will not operate to conserve judicial energy.
The plea of nolo contendere in criminal cases can only be
made with the permission of the court,1°4 but under the instant
rule there is no such safeguard. On the face of the rule there is
no limitation on the situations in which the pleading may be used.
If this is true, is it not desirable and conservative for a defendant
to plead "no contest" to every allegation he would admit if the
"no contest" rule were unavailable? Defendant would not be
penalized. There seems to be no reason for less liberality in granting leave to amend such a pleading than in granting leave to
amend an outright admission. If he amends his answer of "no
contest" to state a denial, it is arguable that his original pleading
cannot be used as an evidential admission in the case. In most
jurisdictions an admission which is amended and changed to a
denial may be so used. 105 Thus, it seems possible that "no contest"
pleading to particular allegations may replace admissions in many
instances. There is certainly no guarantee that such pleading will
be used only with respect to issues which may be of importance
only in collateral proceedings.
The conflict of such a practice with the philosophy that a
trial is a search for truth rather than a game should be given some
consideration. The effects of its solicitude for defendants should
not be ignored. 100 Inevitably such a practice will be misunderstood
by clients and, in some cases, even by lawyers. At least, the plea
of nolo contendere seems to have been misunderstood in many
instances. It has been called a gentlemen's plea of guilty, a plea
which has no implication of a plea of guilty, a plea of implied
guilt, and a plea which is a compromise between the defendant
and the state.107 As a mere guess, one might predict that a plea
104 Mack, Nolo Contendere: Its Use in
105 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 510 (1954).

Michigan, Mich. S.B.J., Aug. 1958, pp. 20, 21.

106 Perhaps it could be argued that the federal pleading rules favor plaintiffs over
defendants and that "no contest" pleading restores some balance. In the first place, the
premise of such an argument is questionable. Secondly, the advantage given the defendant has no rational relation to possible present advantages that plaintiffs enjoy.
107 Lenvin &: Meyers, supra note IOI, at 1255.
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of "no contest" in a civil case will be regarded by the public as
an obfuscation of the law. With some temerity it is suggested that
the device must be assessed in the light of such possible public
misunderstanding. Thus, serious questions may be raised concerning this device which is aimed at protecting defendants
against conclusive and evidential admissions in other suits. At
present its advantages appear to be minimal, although experience
may justify it.

IV.

JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND PARTIES

With a few exceptions, the Michigan joinder and party rules
are substantial copies of their analogous counterparts in the federal rules. There is very little revision to preserve some of the different former Michigan practice, but three notable innovations
in federal and prior Michigan practice merit consideration.

A. Compulsory ]oinder of Claims
Hailed as a meritorious reform, Michigan Rule 203.1 provides
for compulsory joinder of claims and seeks to avoid the so-called
"splitting trap." 108 Specifically, the rule provides that a pleader
shall state every matured claim against an opposing party if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the action and does not require the presence of third
parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. It is
further provided, "Failure by motion or at the pre-trial conference to object to improper misjoinder of claims or failure to join
claims required to be joined constitutes a waiver of the required
joinder rules and the judgment shall not merge more than the
claims actually litigated." 109 Rule 302 requires the judge to inquire of the parties at the pre-trial conference whether plaintiff
has joined all claims under the terms of the joinder rule.
The rule has been explained by the joint committee, Mr.
Honigman, Professor Hawkins, and Professor BlumeY0 Their
discussion will not be repeated at length, but these authorities state
that the Michigan judicial decisions involving questions of the
splitting of a cause of action require joinder of claims arising out
108 Blume, The Scope of a Cause of Action-Elimination of the Splitting Trap,
Mich. S.B.J., Dec. 1959, pp. 10, 13.
109 MICH. RULE

203.1.

110 FINAL REPORT

66-67; I

HoNIGMAN

&:

HAWKINS

474-79; Blume, supra note 108, at IO.
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of the same transaction or occurrence.m Under this case law, a
plaintiff would be precluded from asserting a cause of action which
he could have asserted in a former action which went to judgment. Rule 203.1 is designed to incorporate this case authority
which precludes splitting a cause of action into the new Michigan
rules system as a compulsory joinder rule. 112 Plaintiff is directed
to bring all of the indicated claims in his first suit, but, to avoid
unfairness to him and the harsh results of the former rule against
splitting a cause of action, the new rule provides in effect that, if
the plaintiff does not join all claims, as is required, and if the
defendant fails to object, the related claims which were not joined
may be the subject of another suit without concern over the prior
case law against splitting. If defendant does object to a failure to
join certain allegedly related claims and the judge rules in his
favor, plaintiff may then join the claims. Should plaintiff, however, then fail to join the required claims, it is suggested that such
claims are lost by operation of the principles of res judicata.113 At
the same time it is said that the rule should have no effect upon
the application of res judicata to claims actually litigated in the
case, and that it should not change the res judicata effect on factual issues actually litigated. 114
If the rule operates as indicated above, it may do away with
some of the unfair results of the rule against splitting a cause of
action. A plaintiff will not ordinarily lose a claim he should have
prosecuted in an original suit in which he obtained a judgment.
At the same time, defendant will be given a chance to object to
failure to join related claims, but he will not be given an opportunity to wait and in a later suit on a related claim object
for the first time that plaintiff has split his cause of action and
therefore is precluded from bringing the subsequent suit.
Two principal difficulties have been suggested. The first is
that the rule will not operate as intended if defendant is permitted
to object within the terms of the rule without specifically pointing out a claim which he thinks should be joined. 115 A proper
interpretation of the rule should surmount this difficulty. The
111 In support of this proposition the joint committee cites Arnold v. Masonic Country Club, 268 Mich. 430, 256 N.W. 472 (1934), and Tuttle v. Everhot Heater Co., 264
Mich. 60, 249 N.W. 467 (1933). FINAL REPORT 66.
112 FINAL REPORT 66.
113 1 HONIGMAN &: HAWKINS 477.
114 Id. at 476.
115 Id. at 477-79.
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second difficulty concerns questions relating to the effect of an
appeal or failure to appeal. Such questions are fully discussed by
Mr. Honigrnan and Professor Hawkins.116
In situations in which plaintiff obtains a judgment in an
original action and then commences a second suit on a related
claim, additional general questions are also suggested by the rule.
If Rule 203 were not in effect, and if it were true that the rule
against splitting a cause of action required a plaintiff to join
claims arising from the same transaction, then plaintiff would
have nothing to gain by omitting such a claim in an original suit
against the defendant. Such claims would then be omitted only
through oversight. The penalty would be the defense of res judicata in a second suit on the omitted claims. In this situation,
Rule 203 may tend to operate only to abolish the res judicata rule,
because defendants may often fail to object to the nonjoinder of
related claims. Even· if it is assumed that plaintiffs usually fail to
join related claims under Rule 203 because of oversight (as was
probably true under the former Michigan case law), defendants
may often be unable to ascertain the true reason for omission of
claims known to them. The natural reaction in many cases may
be for defendants to take a chance that plaintiff is unaware of
the possibility of making the claim or of successfully prosecuting
it if he is actually aware of the possibility. Why educate the plaintiff? Also, defendants will not object when they have overlooked
a claim of plaintiff or have concluded that an omitted claim cannot be successful.
In other words, the rule may operate so that it will not result
in more joinders of claims than if the rule were not in existence.
At the same time, it may result in more multiple suits than would
formerly have been possible. If it does so operate, the fundamental
question will be whether avoidance of the hardship on plaintiffs
of the rule against splitting a cause of action justifies a rule with
this result. 117 Of course, at present whether such a result will be
realized is speculative.
The rule and the above remarks are based on the notion that
Id. at 478-79.
Of the complaint that the "splitting" rule is harsh, Judge Clark has said: "Compulsion put upon a litigant to settle his disputes at one time not merely is a proper
safeguard to defendants, but saves time and expense to the court. In view of modem
liberal provisions as to amendment, or even for starting a new action where a previous
one has failed for reasons not going to the merits, the hardship upon a misinformed
plaintiff is small." CLARK 474-75.
116

117
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the Michigan case law which precludes splitting a cause of action
and Rule 203 both require joinder of claims arising out of the
same transaction. 118 However, if the new Michigan rule is adopted
in other jurisdictions, its wording suggests certain basic questions
in connection with existing rules against splitting a cause of action.
The rule against splitting has been based on a rather uncertain
concept of a cause of action.11 9 If Rule 203 were in effect in other
states, the phrase "claims arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence" in the rule might have a broader scope than the term
"cause of action" as interpreted in cases establishing the rule
against splitting a cause of action. 120 Thus, to the extent that
objections by a defendant under the rule would force plaintiff
to add claims to those originally asserted in his complaint, the
rule might force the joinder of some claims which plaintiff would
not need to join if the ordinary rule against splitting a cause of
action were the only sanction he would have to consider for failure
to assert an "entire" cause of action. For example, in some states
it has been held that there are two causes of action or claims when
defendant's act injures plaintiff's person and property.121 If Rule
203.1 were adopted, would there be two claims related to the same
transaction?
The terminology of the rule is not completely clear from a
related viewpoint. Under case law which involves splitting a cause
of action, the courts have sometimes inquired whether plaintiff
has one entire claim or several claims.122 By its terms, Rule 203.1
requires examination of the question whether plaintiff has several
claims arising from the same transaction, or merely several independent claims. It is apparent that the word "claims" is used
differently in these two contexts. The use of the word "claim-" or
"cause of action" in the case law suggests that there may be a
further distinction under Rule 203.1. In some instances, it may
be necessary to distinguish between one claim, claims related to
the same transaction, and independent claims.
Suppose defendant commits acts which constitute a continuous
trespass or nuisance. Does plaintiff have one claim, claims related
118 See note Ill supra.
llO CLARK 476-77.
120 Professor Blume has stated a contrary conclusion.
Claims, 45 MICH. L. REv. 797, 802 (1947).
121 See cases cited in CLARK 488 n.185.
122 "[A]n entire claim • . . cannot be divided and

Blume, Required Joinder of

made the subject of several
suits • • • . The rule does not prevent • . . the prosecution of several actions upon
several causes of action." Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N.Y. 548, 554 (1858).
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to the same transaction, or independent claims? If he has one
claim, Rule 203.1 is not operative, by its terms.
Perhaps the above question can be dismissed as one concerning labels and not substance, particularly if the rule is intended
to have exactly the same scope of operation as case law concerning
splitting a cause of action. In practice, the rule may prove to be
a desirable reform. Nevertheless, it appears that there is sufficient
doubt concerning its probable effectiveness and advantages to
justify postponement of its use as a model elsewhere. In support
of this conclusion, it is also pertinent to consider the attitude that
the rule against splitting a cause of action does not usually cause
difficulty for plaintiffs.
B. Compulsory ]oinder of Parties

A complete revision of Federal Rule 19 relating to compulsory
joinder of parties may prove to be an abortive attempt to improve
the rule in form and content for state practice. First, the disadvantages of adopting Federal Rule 19 for state practice will be
reviewed, and then the Michigan revision will be discussed.
Most of the federal rules operate with comparative practical
convenience, and contain standards which are comprehensible
from the rule itself. In contrast, Federal Rule 19, the required
joinder of parties rule, does not afford these advantages.123 Without the embroidery of case law it is not intelligible. It can be given
meaning only in the light of practice before and after its adoption.124 And the wording is obscure when such practice is taken
into account. Perhaps it may be restated as follows: "All persons
must be joined as parties to a suit as indicated in cases in the
federal courts."
123 "(a) Necessary ]oinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b)
of this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be joined on
the same side as plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should join as a plaintiff
refuses to do so, be may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary
plaintiff.
"(b) Effect of Failure To Join. When persons who are not indispensable, but who ought
to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties, have
not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both service
of process and venue and can be made parties without depriving the court of jurisdiction of the parties before it, the court shall order them summoned to appear in the
action. The court in its discretion may proceed in the action without making such
persons parties, if its jurisdiction over them as to either service of process or venue
can be acquired only by their consent or voluntary appearance or if, though they are
subject to its jurisdiction, their joinder would deprive the court of jurisdiction of the
parties before it; but the judgment rendered therein does not affect the rights or liabilities of absent persons." FED. R. Crv. P. I9(a), (b).
124 3 MooRE 2144-45.
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As a result, it is often difficult to point to any concrete advantages that such a rule will afford when compared to existing
compulsory joinder rules in particular states. Although it may
broaden the area of compulsory joinder, it also substitutes a large
and complicated field of case law in federal courts for the familiar
existing body of state judicial authority. When opponents of the
federal rules system make such an objection to the adoption of a
rule similar to Federal Rule 19, the only practical direct answer
is a rejoinder that the federal rule embodies most of the existing
state law. This reply is essentially unsatisfactory. A conscientious
attorney will be impelled to asc~rtain what the federal cases indicate as a proper course of action in any particular situation.
Particularly annoying is the conflict of opinion in the federal
courts concerning the role that state law should play in the application of Federal Rule 19.125 It is sometimes even difficult to
ascertain whether or not a federal decision on compulsory joinder
of parties follows a particular state rule of the state whose substantive law governs the case.126
There is also a conflict concerning the basic philosophy which
should underlie the rule. On one side is the concept that results
of existing federal decisions are all important. The authority of
similar cases is thus emphasized.127 However, mechanical application of such cases may thereby result. On the other side, to quote
Professor Reed's study of required joinder problems, " ... questions of required joinder should be resolved less and less on the
basis of pat formulations which provide generalized characterizations of parties, and more and more on case by case consideration
of the inter-related and sometimes competing interests . . . .''128
This approach was advocated even in the case of the relatively
simple general situation of suits by joint obligees and against
joint obligors. 129 It leads to the conclusion that Federal Rule 19
is too rigid.
125 For an attempt to synthesize all of the cases, see 2 BARRON &: HoLTZOFF § 511,
at 91-94.
120 See the majority and concurring opinions in the leading case, Greenleaf v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 140 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1944).
127 Referring to the term "joint interest," which is used to describe indispensable
parties in Federal Rule 19(a), Professor Moore stated, "The phrase must be construed
to mean those who were necessary or indispensable parties under the previous practice."
3 MOORE 2144.
128 Reed, Compulsory ]oinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pt. 2), 55 MICH, L. R:ev.
483, 537 (1957).
129 Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pt. 1), 55 MICH. L. R:ev.
327, 366-67, 374 (1957).
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In the face of these and other objections, most of the states
which have adopted the entire federal rules system have nevertheless adopted Federal Rule 19 without making any significant
changes. The difficulties of attempting to revise it have probably
proved too formidable in the midst of a movement to adopt all of
the federal rules. It is much less difficult to accept the rule with
all its inadequacies than to promote a revision-even if agreement can eventually be reached concerning a particular revision.
Contrary to this usual course of action, the Michigan joint committee secured the adoption of a substantial revision of Federal
Rule 19.
The Michigan rule that is similar to Federal Rule 19(a) provides that persons having such interests in the subject matter of
an action that their presence is essential to permit the court to
render complete relief shall be made parties. The reference in
Federal Rule 19(a) to persons "having a joint interest" is deleted.130 Federal Rule 19(b) has also been completely reworded,
and provisions substantially similar to those in the New York
required party rule have been adopted. The Michigan rule states
that the persons having the requisite interest shall be summoned
to appear if they are subject to the jurisdiction of the court. If
they cannot be summoned to appear, the court may grant appropriate relief to those who are parties to prevent a failure oi
justice. In determining whether or not to proceed in such case,
the court is to consider four matters. It should take into account
whether it can render a valid judgment between the existing
parties, whether plaintiff has another effective remedy if the case
is dismissed, whether prejudice will result from the nonjoinder
to defendant or the absent person, and whether such prejudice, if
any, can be avoided or lessened by conditions in an order or the
judgment of the court. Finally, where a person has not been joined
who should have been joined, judgment may still be rendered
against plaintiff when "it is determined that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief as a matter of substantive law." 131
130 "Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 208 and of sub-rule 205.2,
persons having such interests in the subject matter of an action that their presence in
the action is essential to permit the court to render complete relief shall be made parties
and be joined as plaintiffs or defendants and aligned in accordance with their respective
interests." MICH. RULE 205.1. The source of this section is the New York provision that
persons "who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably effected [sic]" shall be
joined. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LA.w & RULES Art. 10, R. 1001 (1962).
131 MICH. RULE 205.2. The model for this section is the New York provision which
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The general scheme of the rule seems to reflect the influence
of a study by Professor Reed and a study in support of a somewhat similar provision in the new New York statute.132 Although
it is impossible to discuss Professor Reed's views in detail, his
formulation of ideal guiding principles in required joinder cases
will be summarized to explain the thrust of the Michigan revision.
Professor Reed states that in required joinder problems the courts
should consider two competing policies. On one side is the policy
of seeking to avoid an adverse factual effect on the interests of
absent persons. However, the court need not take into account
the legal effect of its determination of the case upon such persons'
rights in determining the controversy between the present parties,
because the court's determination will not and cannot legally
affect such rights. 133 On the other side is the policy of "giving a
petitioner as much merited relief as possible." 134 Here, according
to Professor Reed, the obligation of the court is to try to devise
a way to proceed in the absence of a person who should be present
but who cannot be made a party. The desire to do justice "entire
rather than by halves" should not be emphasized. 135 With these
principles in mind, there must be an inquiry by the court into
the circumstances of each claim in which a joinder problem
arises. 136 Thus, joinder questions should be considered on a caseby-case basis.
To summarize, the new Michigan rule directs that all should
be joined to permit the granting of complete relief, but, if persons
who should be joined for such purpose cannot be joined, the
court should proceed and give any effective relief it can to the
actual parties to the suit. In deciding whether or not to proceed,
it should consider all of the factors mentioned in the rule. 137
Theoretically, the above principles and the rule may embody
ideal standards for joinder. But how will the rule work in the
states that an action may proceed in the absence of one who should be a party "when
justice requires." Similar factors are listed for consideration by the court. The New
York statute does not contain the clause whiEh authorizes judgment for plaintiff on
the law. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw &: RULES Art. 10, R. 1001 (1962).
132 Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pts. 1-2), 55 MICH. L. REv.
327, 483 (1957); 1957 Report of the Temporary Comm'n on the Courts, Compulsory
]oinder of Parties, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 6(b), at 233-56.
133 1957 Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts, supra note 132, at
336, 338. See also Reed, supra note 132, at 338 (pt. I).
134 Reed, supra note 132, at 337-38 (pt. I).
135 Id. at 339.
130 Ibid.
137 See the discussion in I HONIGl\fAN &: HAWKINS 546-47.
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day-to-day practice of attorneys before a state's trial courts? Will
its idealistic goal of case-by-case treatment be realized? Perhaps
the method used by Mr. Honigman and Professor Hawkins in
explaining the rule is an indication. First, they discuss the general
principles embodied in the rule and the general way in which it
should operate. Then they proceed to explain its operation in
some general types of cases (and properly so). For example, how
should joint tortfeasors be treated? It is said that since they need
not have been joined prior to adoption of the rule, and the substantive law prior to the rule was that complete relief could be obtained against any one of them, joint tortfeasors need not be
joined.188 In a discussion of other types of parties, a general result
is suggested in at least eight situations.189 No detraction from the
excellent discussion is intended; in fact, a sufficient explanation
of the rule makes such a discussion necessary. The point is that
lawyers, judges, and even commentators on procedural rules must
live in a practical, workaday world which requires a certain number of rules of thumb in procedural matters. Inevitably they will
mechanize general rules. Precedents will not be limited to completely particularized fact situations which appeared in previously decided cases.
Perhaps it is unfair at this early stage in the use of the rule
to predict that it will not in the long run accomplish the resolution of required joinder problems "less and less on the basis of
pat formulations which provide generalized characterizations of
parties," to use Professor Reed's words, but, as a mere guess, it is
not likely to accomplish such a result any more than would the
adoption of Federal Rule 19. In spite of this guess, it may engender a climate in which Michigan judges, compared to those
governed by Federal Rule 19, will strive with greater effect to
retain cases in the absence of persons who should be joined but
cannot be joined and to proceed in order to grant all possible
relief between the actual parties. This result is a principal goal.
Is the generality of the revised rule (and the similar New York
rule) any more desirable than the generality of Federal Rule 19?
If Rule 19 is to be revised, it might well be made specific in its
application to certain types of cases. For example, in a state which
does not authorize suit by or against partners in the partnership
1ss
139

Id. at 551.
Id. at 551-57.
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name, it seems desirable to spell out the rules of joinder in suits
by or against partnerships. In short, it is difficult to refrain, as
space limits require, from expressing disagreement in part with
the complete case-by-case approach advocated by Professor Reed. 140
Suffice it to say that some consideration should be given to the
fact that party rules, like all procedural rules, should be designed
for everyday use in routine cases and not only for use in complicated cases. Furthermore, they should be useful to all members of
the bar and not just to the most astute attorneys. They should not
place a premium on uncertainty of result. Finally, it should be
remembered that party rules are not simply rules for the courts.
In particular instances it is important to identify, prior to suit,
the parties who must be joined if suit is brought. When the above
considerations are taken into account, the Michigan revision and
the somewhat similar New York rule do not seem to be ideal
solutions of the problems raised by Federal Rule 19. At least
Federal Rule 19, with its encrustation of case law, furnishes some
basis for prediction. Also, the Michigan revision furnishes little
improvement over Federal Rule 19 in regard to the problem of
distinguishing between parties the plaintiff need not join in any
event and those parties he must join under the rule if joinder is
possible. On the affirmative side, the Michigan rule should accomplish one vital reform. It should abolish the notion that absence of an indispensable party is a jurisdictional defect.
Two specific innovations in the Michigan rule merit further
comment. Rule 111.3 provides, in effect, that failure to object
to nonjoinder of required parties by motion or by responsive
pleading waives the objection. Supporting this rule is the theory
that nonjoinder is not a jurisdictional defect.14 1 Furthermore, the
compulsory joinder rule is regarded as being primarily for the
benefit of the defendant, and thus he should take timely advantage
140 The Michigan and New York rules seem to reflect in part a notion expressed
by the New York advisory committee. "These [the factors for consideration listed in the
rules] are the factors which should be considered in determining questions of indispensability. In varying degrees the courts have considered them, though often incompletely,
and with unfortunate language which misleads the mechanically minded. The subject
defies precise written rule; it calls for discernment as to how the various factors should
be weighed in the individual case. However, general reference in a statute or court
rule to the various interests involved, indicating the sort of attention which should be
given to the matter, would be helpful to both bench and bar." 1957 Report of the
Temporary Comm'n on the Courts, supra note 132, at 251.
141 MICH. RULE 111.3; 1 HoNIGMAN &: HAWKINS 546; Reed, supra note 132, at 332-34
(pt. 1).
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of it. 142 Mr. Honigman and Professor Hawkins suggest that if a
nonjoinder objection is first made on appeal, the trial court's
decision should not be reversed. 143 They also suggest, however,
that since Rule 207 authorizes parties to be added at any stage of
the proceedings, the appellate court may still consider the factors
listed in Rule 203.1 and decide whether or not the judgment
should be allowed to stand. In this situation it has been stated that
the court should not consider prejudice to the defendant arising
from the nonjoinder because the defendant has waived any such
objection.144
Some disagreement with the above ideas could be expressed.
For example, is it always true that the objection is primarily for
the benefit of defendant? Conceding that the above-mentioned
notions are valid, should it be concluded that joinder questions
should be raised at the latest by the responsive pleading? Party
questions can often be difficult and complicated, and they will
tend to be even more difficult if a true case-by-case approach is
actually taken by the courts. This consideration indicates that
defendant should not be required to raise the joinder issue at the
stage of answer under the penalty of waiver. He should be given
the opportunity to raise the objection for the first time within
some period of time after the pleading stage. Although the nonjoinder objection should not be regarded as jurisdictional, it
is arguable that recognition should be given to its importance.
The second important innovation in the compulsory joinder
rule is that part which provides that, if there is a failure to join
a person who should have been joined under the rule, the court
may enter a judgment against a plaintiff who is not entitled to
relief as a matter of substantive law.145 In support of this provision it is argued that a judgment that a plaintiff is not entitled
to relief as a matter of substantive law should not be reversed
simply for failure to join a necessary party.14 6 In addition, since
the rule is also effective at the trial level, it seems to reflect the
broad viewpoint that failure to join a person who should be joined
under the rule is of no moment if the relief secured in the suit
does not harm him. 147 The instant provision reinforces the phi142 FINAL REPORT 75.
143 1 HONIGllrAN &: HAWKINS 558.
144 Ibid.
145 MICH. RULE 205.2, quoted in the text at note 131 supra.
146 1 HONIGMAN &: HAWKINS 558.
147 See discussion of this viewpoint in Reed, supra note 132,

at 532-37 (pt. 2).
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losophy that the trial court should give whatever relief it can give
without prejudice to the absent party.148
On the other hand, a trial judge may err in rendering a judgment on the law against plaintiff. If his decision is reversed on
appeal and the case may not proceed without the absent party,
there has also been a waste of time and effort. 149 Furthermore,
even though a judgment against plaintiff may have no legal effect
on absent parties, it could have important extra-legal effects. It
should also be noted that the rule is not clear in specifying the
stage of the suit at which the judge may rule on the law against
the plaintiff, within the terms of the rule, or whether his ruling
can only be made on the face of the complaint. 150
Again, it seems desirable to postpone consideration of adoption of this Michigan party rule until substantial experience is had
with it in Michigan.

C. Permissive ]oinder of Parties
An innovation in the permissive joinder of parties rule alters
the old saw, "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em." It seems to say, "If
you can lick 'em, join 'em." In addition to the provision of Federal
148 See Bourdieu v. Pacific W. Oil Co., 299 U.S. 65 (1936), in which the Court stated:
"Since, plainly, the bill of complaint did not state a cause of action, the United States
could have no interest in the case requiring its presence as a party; and the inquiry
as to whether it was an indispensable party, which would have been entirely proper
under a good bill, was here wholly gratuitous.
"The rule is that if the merits of the cause may be determined without prejudice
to the rights of necessary parties, absent and beyond the jurisdiction of the court, it
will be done; and a court of equity will strain hard to reach that result. . . . If it be
urged that the United States is an indispensable party and, hence, that the court may
not proceed even to inquire whether the bill states a cause of action, the answer is
that iood sense suggests precisely the contrary. For a mere inspection of the bill at
once discloses that it states no cause of action and, therefore, the United States is not
an indispensable party, since it cannot be prejudiced by, and has no interest reqttiring
protection in, a proceeding which at the threshold is seen to be without substance.
Nothing is to be gained by an inquiry into the status of absent parties when it is
certain upon the face of complainant's bill that in no event will he be entitled to a
decree in his favor." Id. at 70-71.
140 As indicated in the quotation in note 148 supra, the Supreme Court emphasized
that in the Bourdieu case it was certain that no cause of action was stated by complainant's bill. In Smith v. Sperling, 237 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds,
354 U.S. 91 (1957), the court of appeals ordered the trial court to determine the legal
sufficiency of a cause of action asserted by plaintiff before proceeding to consider a nonjoinder objection under Federal Rule 19. The clarity of the objection to plaintiff's
complaint was not mentioned.
150 In Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 782 (1946), the majority opinion states that the rule of the Bourdieu case does not
apply if the complaint states a cause of action. See discussion in Reed, supra note 132,
at 530-37 (pt. 2). Michigan Rule 506 does not seem to be so restricted.
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Rule 20 that parties may be joined if there is asserted by or against
them any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series thereof, and if any question of
law or fact common to them all will arise in the action, Michigan
Rule 206 states that all persons may join as plaintiffs or be joined
as defendants in one action "if it appears that their presence in
the action will promote the convenient administration of justice."151
When will the presence of parties "promote the convenient
administration of justice"? A similar provision in a former Michigan statute did not authorize plaintiffs to join unless their
causes of action were joint and did not authorize plaintiffs to join
defendants unless the liability was one asserted against all of
them. 152 It appears that if the instant clause of the rule has this
meaning it adds nothing to Federal Rule 20(a). Therefore, it has
been urged that the clause authorizes joinder although claims and
parties may not be joined under Federal Rule 20(a).153 More specifically, it is suggested that plaintiff may join claims against one or
more but not all of the defendants with a claim against all of multiple defendants when the former claims do not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence (or series of transactions or occurrences)
which gave rise to the claim against all the multiple defendants. 154
There is some support for the view that the same result follows
under Federal Rule 20(a).155 However, it is contrary to the majority of federal court decisions on the subject.156 These cases take
the viewpoint that all claims by or against multiple parties must
relate to the same transaction or occurrence under Federal Rule
20(a).
It can be questioned whether the wholesale joinder of unrelated claims in multiple party suits is desirable. Even if such
joinder is desirable in some instances, the circumstances under
which joinder is generally authorized to promote the convenient
administration of justice remains a mystery. The standard is so
broad it may be largely ineffective. Or if it is made effective by
151
152
153

MICH. RULE

206.1.

578.
Id. at 578-79.
154 Id. at 579-80.
155 See the argument in 2 BARRON & HoLTZOFF § 533.1, and in Wright, ]oinder of
Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 MINN. L. REY. 580, 604-11 (1952).
156 The applicable cases are cited and discussed in 2 BARRON & HoLTZOFF § 533,1.
1 HoNIGMAN & HAWKINS
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the courts, the standard does not indicate the areas in which it
will be effective.
As it now stands, the instant provision appears undesirable as
a model for a change in Federal Rule 20(a).
V.

DISCOVERY RULES

For the most part, the new Michigan discovery rules follow
the format and content of the federal discovery rules. Of the various revisions which have been made, three are of primary importance.

A. Limitation of Discovery to Matter Which Is Relevant and
Admissible Under the Rules of Evidence
In its final report the joint committee recommended that the
discovery rules in Michigan should have the same scope of operation as the federal rules. 157 Under the federal rules, discovery may
be had regarding any matter which is not privileged and which is
relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. 158 Testimony
may be elicited, even if it is not admissible at the trial, if it appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.159
The prior Michigan rules had limited the taking of depositions and pre-trial discovery to "matter not privileged and admissible under the rules of evidence governing trials, which is
relevant to the subject matter involving the pending action." 16
In rejecting this limitation, the joint committee tersely stated~
"The admissibility and relevancy test of the present rules is
eliminated, and the Federal Rules followed. What is admissible
and relevant depends on factors that can be known only when
the matter is offered in evidence at the trial, and not at this early
stage of the proceedings." 161 However, the recommendation of the
joint committee was not followed. When the discovery rules were
finally promulgated, they limited the taking of depositions by the
above-mentioned language used in the former Michigan rule. 162
()1

84-85.
158 F.ED. R. CIV. P. 26 (depositions), 33 (interrogatories), 34 (discovery and production
of documents and things).
150 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
100 Former Michigan Rule 35.
101 FINAL REPORT 85.
102 MICH. RULE 302.2(1).
157 FINAL REPORT
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Presumably the justification for an "admissibility" limitation
relates to a fear that without the limitation discovery procedures
can be mere "fishing expeditions." 163 Is there anything of substance in this reason for the limitation if the federal discovery
rules are otherwise adopted?
In answering this question, consideration should be given to
the reasons for the use of depositions and interrogatories for the
purpose of discovery-a purpose which is specificially mentioned
in the new Michigan rules. 164 These reasons for discovery procedures have been reviewed many times by judges and commentators.
In summary, the discovery rules were devised to provide means
for full disclosure of all facts for presentation at the trial, exposure
of groundless claims, creation of a rational basis for settlement,
and delimitation of the area of controversy. Discovery affords the
opportunity to avoid surprise, confusion, and gamesmanship.165
To accomplish these purposes fully, "fishing expeditions" for inadmissible evidence are necessary if that epithet means a search
for facts which are relevant but inadmissible. In Michigan it is
not entirely true that it "is no longer a valid objection that counsel's discovery proceedings may constitute a 'fishing expedition,'
if there appears any reasonable possibility that there be fish in
the pond." 166
Furthermore, the limitation is not necessary to protect a party
against discovery of irrelevant matter. Court orders may be ob163 In rejecting a contention that an administrator of a decedent's estate could not
take the deposition of a plaintiff without waiving the plaintiff's disqualification under
the dead man's statute, the court made the following statement concerning the instant
limitation, "It will be noted, however, that, at least so far as matters not privileged are
concerned, the limitation pertains not to the identity, qualifications or competence of
a witness but to the competency of the evidence and its relevance to the subject matter
of the litigation. This limitation was intended to prevent fishing expeditions into areas
unrelated to the cause of action, not to impede a party in discovering from any person,
whether competent as a witness or not, all facts and information, not privileged, which
are relevant to that cause of action." Banaszkiewicz v. Baun, 359 Mich. 109, 115-16, 101
N.W.2d 306, 308-09 (1960).
164 "After commencement of an action, any party may take the testimony of any
person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interroga•
tories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both
purposes." MICH. RULE 302.1.
165 Representative comments are contained in the following materials: Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266 (1961); 2A BARRON &: HoLTZOFF § 641; 4 MooRE 1031-36; The
Practical Operation of Federal Discovery (A Symposium on the Use of Depositions and
Discovery Under the Federal Rules), 12 F.R.D. 131, 139 (1951); Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. R.Ev. 940, 944-46 (1961).
166 BELLI, MonERN TRIALS 29 (abridged ed. 1963).
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tained to protect against annoyance, embarrassment or oppression
under the federal and Michigan rules. 167 As mentioned below, the
Michigan rules also furnish adequate protection against unnecessary discovery of materials gathered for the suit and prohibit investigation of some of the work product of an attorney.
One of the chief criticisms of the federal discovery rules is the
charge that discovery often necessitates unreasonable expense. The
instant limitation can have little effect upon expense. It should
also be noted that the Michigan rule provides that the court may
issue orders to protect a party against undue expense. 168
It has already been suggested that the complaint should be
required to state a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief, as specified in Federal Rule 8. In states in which such a provision is
in force, adoption of the instant limitation in the discovery rules
would be particularly illogical because the discovery of the facts
and the delimitation of the controversy by discovery are more important goals when relatively general complaints are possible.
Thus, once the federal rules system is adopted, the addition
of the instant limitation is neither very logical nor sensible. Of
course, it cannot be denied that, even with this limitation, the
Michigan discovery rules are useful.
B. Work Product of Client and Attorney

The Michigan rules also include express restrictions on discovery of writings prepared in anticipation of litigation, statements
secured from witnesses, and other "work product" of the client and
his attorney. Rule 306.2 contains the following provisions:
"The court shall not order the production or inspection of
any writing prepared by the adverse party, his attorney,
surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or
in preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking
the production or inspection in preparing his claim or defense
or will cause him undue hardship or injustice. The court shall
not order the production or inspection of any statement obtained from an adverse party or other witness by a party, his
attorney, surety, indemnitor or agent in anticipation of litigation unless a copy of such statement was not given to the wit107
10s

FED. R. CIV. P. 30, 31, 33.
MrcH. Ruu:s 306.2, 307.2, 309.2.
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ness or party or unless the court is satisfied that the denial
of production and inspection will unfairly prejudice the party
seeking the production or inspection in preparing his claim
or defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice."
Also, production or inspection of writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, or legal theories cannot
be ordered.169
The first sentence quoted above from Rule 306.2 is somewhat
similar to an amendment to the federal rules proposed in 1946. It
is essentially a compromise between proposals that the described
material be privileged and that the described material be subject
to discovery without limitation.17° If a specific compromise between extreme viewpoints is to be adopted, it is a feasible alternative. However, as indicated in the discussion below, it should be
expanded to include statements of witnesses.
Although the rule is workable, very little guidance is furnished
· by the language of the limitation. From this standpoint, it might
well be desirable to indicate more clearly the factors which attorneys and judges should consider, or, on the other hand, to place
greater emphasis on the discretion of the trial judge.
A number of questions are raised by the separate treatment of
statements of witnesses and parties in the second sentence quoted
from Rule 306.2. It requires that, in addition to the matters which
a court should consider in ordering production of writings under
the first sentence quoted above, the matter of whether the adverse party or other witness was given a copy of his statement
should be a pertinent factor for consideration when production
of witnesses' statements is sought.
The consideration which a court should give to this matter
is not clearly indicated. Ambiguous and awkward, the sentence
suggests various interpretations. The following questions do not
exhaust the possibilities. Does the sentence mean that production
by an opponent of a statement of a witness who is not a party can
be ordered only if the copy of the statement was not given to the
169 MICH. RULE 306.2.
170 Advisory Committee

on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D.
433, 457-60 (1946). See generally Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 165,
at 1027-44.
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witness and denial of production would prejudice the party seeking production? Does it mean that the court may order production
of a copy without more ado on the mere showing that the opponent did not originally give a copy to the witness? Does the sentence mean that, even if the witness was given a copy of his statement, the court may order production by the opponent who has
a copy if the party seeking production would otherwise be prejudiced or harmed if he did not obtain a copy from anyone? Does
it mean that the court may order production by the opponent only
if the party seeking production would be prejudiced or harmed
because he cannot presently obtain a copy from the witness who
was originally given a copy by the opponent?
Perhaps the most logical interpretation on the face of the
language is the interpretation that a court may not ordinarily
order production by the opponent if the witness has been given
a copy of his statement, but, if for some reason the party demanding the copy will be prejudiced by lack of production by the opponent (because the witness has lost his copy, etc.), the production
can still be ordered. On the other hand, if the witness has not
been given a copy of his statement, perhaps production of the
opponent's copy may be ordered without any further showing.
Perhaps a showing of prejudice might still be required if the witness has not been given a copy. The question of whether a witness
has a copy of his statement demanded froin the opponent appears
relatively unimportant in any event. The opponent has no substantive objection to producing a statement of a witness if he can
only object that the witness has a copy.
The Michigan rule would thus be much simplified if the first
sentence quoted above included statements of witnesses as well as
other writings, and if the second sentence were eliminated.

C. Miscellaneous Provisions
Upon permission of the court or stipulation of the parties,
depositions may be electronically recorded. 171 This provision permits accumulation of experience with electronic devices.
Various other minor additions are made to the federal rules.
Some of these embody proposed amendments to the federal rules
which have not been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
171 MICH. RULE

306.3.

1432

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

States. Others amplify or clarify specific provisions m the federal
rules. 172

VI.

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

Michigan Rule 30 I is similar to the former Michigan rule
concerning mandatory pre-trial conferences. The matters which
should be considered at such a conference are stated in much more
detail than in the federal rule. 173 In this respect, the Michigan rule
is a substantial improvement over the federal rule, which specifies
the subject matter of a conference in vague, general terms. 174 It
172 Some of these changes are treated in Comment, Pre-Trial Deposition and Discovery Under the Michigan General Court Rules of 1963, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 417 (1962).
173 "In every contested civil action the court shall direct the attorneys for the parties
to appear before it for a conference to
(1) state and simplify the factual and legal issues to be litigated, to consider the
formal amendment of pleadings or their amendment by pretrial order, and if desirable
or necessary, to order that such amendments be made;
(2) hear and determine all pending defenses filed under Rule 110.16 and motions
which should be disposed of before trial; and determine whether a jury trial shall be
had pursuant to demand, if any, theretofore made;
(3) consider the consolidation of cases for trial, the separation of issues, and the
order of trial when some issues are to be tried by a jury and some by the court;
(4) consider admissions of fact and authenticity of documents, including ordinances,
charters, and regulations, which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(5) consider limiting the number of expert witl'lesses and whether the parties wish
to agree to the appointment of an impartial expert;
(6) specify all damage claims in detail as of the date of the conference but the
amount of liability insurance carried by a party shall not be required to be disclosed
at the pretrial conference or by means of discovery unless it is relevant to an issue in
the case and admissible in evidence;
(7) produce all proposed exhibits in the possession of the attorneys in support of
the main case or defense and admit the authenticity of such exhibits whenever possible;
(8) arrange for completion of discovery proceedings, physical examinations, and
depositions;
(9) submit and consider appropriate authorities in support of contentions made;
(10) estimate the time required for trial;
(11) discuss the possibility of settlement;
(12) consider all other matters that may aid in the disposition of the action." MICH.
RULE

301.1.

"In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties
to appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid
unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings to
be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to
any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed
of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the
174
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is particularly desirable for use in a state in which pre-trial conferences have not been previously authorized.
The nationwide controversy concerning the utility of a pretrial conference will not be recounted here. In any event, the
experience in Michigan with mandatory conferences should be
investigated in every jurisdiction in which provisions similar to
the federal rules are effective.
VII.

TRIAL, JUDGMENT, AND POST-TRIAL RULES

Whenever the federal rules which apply to procedures prior
to trial are adopted, a few federal rules relating to trial and judgment must also be adopted. 175 All such rules have been adopted
in Michigan. The remaining trial and post-trial rules are important, but space limitations preclude discussion of them here.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Judge Clark stated his reaction to new rule proposals of the
Advisory Committee for the Temporary Commission on the New
York Courts as follows: "One senses a conceived necessity to use
much of the federal system while disguising this use so far as
may be." 176 He also concluded that the New York proposals (which
have now been enacted) followed an outmoded pattern of "confusing intermixtures of the federal practice denatured by local
rules." 177
The Michigan rules that are effective prior to trial cannot be
so characterized, because they contain federal rules provisions to
a greater degree. And it is also true that the new Michigan rules
and statutes constitute, for Michigan, the major and enlightened
reform characterized in the quotation at the beginning of this
article. Nevertheless, the above review of major changes in the
federal rules indicates rather clearly that the Michigan rules do
not embody as logical and coherent a system of procedure prior
to trial as does the federal rules system without the Michigan
changes. It seems inevitable that lack of complete consistency and
subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice." FED. R. Crv. P. 16.
175 Fro. R. Cxv. P. 42 (Consolidation; Separate Trials), 54 (b) and (c) (Judgment Upon
Multiple Claims; Demand for Judgment), 62(h) (Stay of Judgment Upon Multiple Claims).
176 Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 CoLU.M. L. REv. 435, 448 (1958).
177 Id. at 447-48.

1434

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

unity will result from a hybrid system of procedure which is based
essentially upon the federal rules system, with substantial changes
motivated in part by a desire to retain some prior state practices
not contained in the federal rules, and in part by a desire to improve specific federal rules by innovations.
The major changes which have been made in the federal rules
in order to retain prior Michigan practice do not for the most
part furnish desirable models for other states in which the federal
rules system is employed or contemplated. Each major innovation
must be judged on its merits. Some of the major innovations discussed here are not desirable models; some are at the least presently questionable. It is fair to conclude that, taken as a whole,
the Michigan pre-trial procedural rules system is not as desirable
for use in other states as the federal rules system without the
Michigan changes.

